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ABSTRACT
The effect of recent agricultural market reforms in many developing countries is
often measured through tests for market integration by analyzing co-variation of
food prices. However, market integration studies often fail to link the discovery of
the lack of integration to causal factors. This analysis documents and relates
price variation to structural determinants in the case of Madagascar. The spatial
variability between communities is linked to the distance to a paved road, the
quality of the road, access to soft infrastructure, and the level of competition
between traders. Differences in seasonal variation are mainly related to the
differential opportunity costs of capital in rice villages and to hard infrastructure
in non-rice villages. Communities that lack basic infrastructure show lower prices
during the harvest season and higher seasonal gaps. Moreover, it is shown that
road distance matters more than road quality during the harvest period as there
is no strong relationship between road quality and the producer price decline per
unit of time. While the presence of roads shows up in relatively higher producer
prices, it does not automatically lead to more competition among traders. Hence,
investment in hard infrastructure is not sufficient to successfully increase market
access. However, soft infrastructure on top of hard infrastructure seems
beneficial for increased producer prices, reduced price variability, and improved
market integration.1
1.  INTRODUCTION
Variation in agricultural prices is a central factor for household food security as
prices determine the income received for food crops by selling households and
the ability to purchase food for consumer households. The switch from fixed to
liberalized prices in agricultural markets in many developing economies has
significantly influenced village and household welfare after reforms. The
presence of infrastructure often determines if a village receives higher or lower
prices after market liberalization as transport costs, different due to distance and
the quality of infrastructure, influence how the benefits (costs) from a liberalized
environment are shared between producers and other economic agents, i.e.
transporters, middlemen, and consumers. 
In a liberalized environment, the presence of infrastructure, such as roads and
market sites, is expected to increase the efficiency of both marketing and
production as they reduce transactions costs and ensure more competitive
pricing conditions in marketing than would occur in their absence. Previous
research on the impact of marketing infrastructure on agriculture concludes that
road quality increases the use of fertilizer (Ahmed and Hossain 1990) and
enhances total agricultural output with an elasticity of about 0.20 (Binswanger et
al. 1993). It has been shown that deficient transport infrastructure is an important
determinant of low technological adoption, cropping choices and of low
agricultural productivity in developing countries (Omamo 1998; Zeller et al.
1998; Von Oppen et al. 1997; Antle 1983) while price policies, with respect to
transport pricing might create distorting signals. For example, Gersovitz (1989,
1992) shows how panterritorial pricing affects transport investment strategies
while Masters and Nuppenau (1993) show how liberalization would improve
efficiency and equity in the case of maize in Zimbabwe.2
A second strain of literature on the relation of infrastructure and agriculture looks
at the impact of transport costs on agricultural price behavior after liberalization.
Goetz (1992) and de Janvry et al. (1991, 1992) argue that due to transaction
costs, a household specific price band exists for the same commodity between
its purchase and selling price. The poorer the infrastructure, the greater the size
of the band. The measure of market integration - one of the objectives of market
reforms - has been studied extensively, methodologically as well as empirically,
in the recent literature, for example by Alexander and Wyeth (1994), Alderman
(1993), Badiane and Shively (1998), Barrett (1996), Bauch (1997), Dercon
(1995), Fafchamps (1992), Fafchamps and Gavian (1996), Goletti et al. (1994),
and Mendoza and Rosegrant (1995). However, while the measurement of the
extent of market integration after reform is important, clear policy implications do
not often follow directly from the results of market integration models as the
discovery of lack of spatial or temporal integration might be due to a variety of
factors.  
In a well-functioning liberalized economy prices should reflect costs to move
products in space, time, or form. The contribution of this paper is to study the
structural determinants of price variation over space and time and to illustrate
the quantitative importance of their effects based on a unique, extensive, and
recent community survey in the liberalized environment of Madagascar. The
structure of the document is as follows. First, the data and descriptive statistics
for the study region are presented. Price levels and seasonal movements in road
conditions, product prices, and urban rural price ratios are then discussed.
Subsequently, the methodology is presented, and determinants of market
access, price levels, and price variability are analyzed. The last section closes
with the main findings and implications.3
 For a detailed overview of methodology and sampling frame, see Ralison et al.
1
(1997).
2.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
DATA
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the local Ministry of
Scientific Research (FOFIFA) organized a community survey in May 1997 in
Madagascar. One hundred and eighty eight communities were randomly
selected using a stratified sampling frame that distinguished strata based on
agro-ecological conditions, village size, and the distance from the village to the
nearest tarred road . This survey contained information on the levels (in 1997)
1
and changes (compared to 10 and 5 years ago) in the demographic
characteristics, agricultural production systems, agricultural input and output
markets, access to infrastructure, and environmental data in the community.
These data were collected in the faritany (regions) of Mahajanga, Fianarantsoa,
and in one sub-region of Antananarivo (Vakinankaratra), the three main
production regions in Madagascar. Each of the faritany was divided into agro-
ecological zones that served as the basis for the stratified sampling. Within the
faritany of Mahajanga, three agro-ecological strata are differentiated: Mahajanga
- plains, characterized by the existence of large irrigation schemes, the
highlands ("Plateaux") of  Mahajanga, and the rest of Mahajanga. Within the
faritany of Fianarantsoa, three agro-ecological zones were also differentiated:
the highlands ("Hautes Terres"), the foothills ("Falaise"), and the coastal ("Côte")
regions. In the tables presented in this paper, we aggregate the latter two4
 Fokontany = village; firaisana = district; fivondronana = subregion; faritany =
2
region
regions into a subregion called Côte/Falaise of Fianarantsoa. We do the same
for the Mahajanga Plateaux region. In the analysis of descriptive statistics as
well as regressions, each community is weighted to reflect its importance in the
total population.
MARKET ACCESS AND PRICE LEVELS 
Only 8 percent of the fokontany report a regular market within the fokontany
(Table 1) . Most markets are only regularly held in the chef-lieu of the firaisana.
2
The average distance to the main market for the sample as a whole is almost 10
km. This distance is as high as 21 km for Mahajanga - Plateaux where it takes,
on average, almost 5 hours to get to the market. The longer distance implies that
people take the oxcart ("charette") relatively more often to go to the market–37
percent in Mahajanga - Plateaux–while in other regions transport by foot is
almost the only transportation used. Compared to the other regions, it seems
that Mahajanga - Plateaux has the most difficult access to market outlets given
the low number of fokontany that have a market and the longer time required to
get to a market. 5
Table 1-Characteristics of market access
Region Fokontany  Average Average time  Importance of
that have a distance to reach transport by
market to market market foot
(percent) (km) (hours) (percent)
Mahajanga:Plains 5.9 6.64 1.70 71.8
Mahajanga:Plateaux 2.0 21.41 4.70 57.3
Fianar:Highlands 4.3 6.30 1.22 95.7
Fianar:Côte/Falaise 16.7 4.31 0.89 100.0
Vakinankaratra 11.0 8.27 1.41 92.8
Total 8.0 9.71 2.03 86.6
Source: IFPRI/FOFIFA - community survey, 1997 (n=188 communities)
To assess changes in competition levels between traders, the fokontany leaders
were asked if they could always, never, or occasionally choose between traders
to sell their agricultural products. Fifty-one percent of the communities report
that they can always choose between traders while 27 percent of the
communities in the overall sample report they can never choose (Table 2). The
possibility of choice among traders in food marketing is quite different for the
different regions. Almost all the communities in Fianarantsoa - Côte/Falaise and
Mahajanga - Plains report that they can always choose between different traders
to sell their products while only 27 percent and 33 percent in Fianarantsoa -
Highlands and Mahajanga - Plateaux respectively report they can do so. On
average, the competition - to the extent that choice reflects competition - seems
to be more intense in 1997 than five years earlier: 45 percent of the communities
could always choose between traders five years ago compared to 51 percent
now. The number of communities that could never choose declined slightly from
29 percent to 27 percent. The situation improved dramatically in Fianarantsoa -
Highlands while it got a little worse in the Vakinankaratra region. 6
Table 2-Possibility of choice between different traders to sell main agricultural
products (recall by village leaders)
Region Choice 1997 Five years earlier
(1992)
Mahajanga:Plains Always 91.7 88.3
Never 8.3 11.7
Total 100.0 100.0




















Source: IFPRI/FOFIFA - community survey, 1997 (n=188 communities)
Good market access is one of the factors that influence price levels. Monthly
prices for different products during the June 1996 to May 1997 period were
gathered. As the different regions are characterized by different production
seasons, the lowest price of rice during the year was taken to allow comparisons
of the price level between regions. Rice prices are lowest in the Mahajanga -7
 The price was asked as a purchase price in Ariary of one "kapoaka" of low
3
quality (C2) rice (1 Ariary = 5 Fmg; 3.5 kapoaka of rice = 1 kg).
 See Barrett (1997) for an in-depth analysis in rural areas; see Minten (1997) for
4
analysis at the urban level.
Plateaux (964 Fmg/kg)  and in Fianarantsoa - Highlands (1077 Fmg/kg). In the
3
other regions, average rice prices are almost at the same level (1215 Fmg/kg)
and 26 percent higher on average than in the Mahajanga Plateaux (Table 3).
The standard deviation of rice prices within each region are lowest in the
Vakinankaratra and the Fianarantsoa - Highlands regions reflecting a more
homogenous situation and smaller differences in infrastructure compared to
other regions. Compared to other products such as cassava, the spatial variation
for the price of rice is small reflecting its omnipresence. 
SEASONAL MOVEMENTS
Seasonality is an important defining characteristic of agricultural activities in
general, and Malagasy agriculture and marketing more specifically. Seasonality
shows up in different growing seasons, timely marketing periods, changing
consumption patterns, and food prices. It is possible that changes in marketing
after liberalization have made for increased variability of prices and/or for
increased seasonal price movements . If poorer households do not have the
4
liquidity to smooth consumption, such variability might result in a welfare loss
and contribute to malnutrition. This seems to be the case. UNICEF estimates
that malnutrition levels are 15 percent higher during the lean season  than
during the harvest season (SECALINE 1996). It seems that the seasonal
movement in prices is more harmful for poorer households as they are
disproportionally buyers of rice during the lean season (Barrett and Dorosh 8
Table 3-Prices and standard deviation for different products at time of survey (in
Fmg)
Region Kg of rice  Kg of dry
cassava
Mahajanga:Plains Mean 1220 636
Std. Deviation 271 263
Median 1225 500
Mahajanga:Plateaux Mean 964 668
Std. Deviation 263 184
Median 875 625
Fianar:Highlands Mean 1077 611
Std. Deviation 129 114
Median 1050 600
Fianar:Côte/Falaise Mean 1218 921
Std. Deviation 255 453
Median 1231 800
Vakinankaratra Mean 1212 510
Std. Deviation 177 290
Median 1225 500
Total Mean 1113 638
Std. Deviation 236 252
Median 1050 600
Source: IFPRI/FOFIFA - community survey, 1997 (n=188 communities)
1996; Minten  et al. 1998). This section discusses seasonal movements in
marketing periods and agricultural prices, agricultural price ratios between rural
areas and urban centers, and road conditions. 
Infrastructure and Seasonal Movements in Road Conditions 
The variability in the quality of road infrastructure, over time and space, is
presumably an important explanatory variable of price levels and seasonal
spreads of agricultural product prices in the different fokontany.  Eight percent,9
57 percent, and 72 percent of the fokontany in the survey region  respectively
report a paved road, a non paved all-season road, and a seasonal road within
their fokontany (Table 4). It takes, on average, 4.1 hours and 0.9 hours to get to
the paved and non-paved all season road during most of the marketing period
(dry season). Differences in price levels between seasons are caused by
different production conditions and storage costs, but also by transport costs and
changing road conditions between the wet and the dry season. An estimate of
the time required to get to the main roads and secondary roads shows that the
difference between these two periods is quite significant. The time required to
get to a paved road in the Mahajanga - Plateaux area during the rainy season is
more than twice the time during the dry season. In some cases, it is impossible
to get to the paved road during the rainy season and other means of transport,
such as water transport, have to be used. The difference in time required to get
to a paved road between the dry and the wet season is smallest in the
Vakinankaratra and Fianarantsoa - Highlands region where it is less than 15
percent.
Table 4-Characteristics of access to road infrastructure
Region Available in fokontany Time required to get to 
Wet season Dry season
Paved All-season Seasonal Paved All-season Paved All-season
road road road road road road road
(percent) (hours)
Mahajanga:Plains 17.8 31.4 85.6 2.24 1.78 1.88 1.28
Mahajanga:Plateaux 1.2 29.7 73.3 20.68 3.98 10.31 2.51
Fianar:Highlands 7.5 76.9 80.8 1.87 0.20 1.53 0.20
Fianar:Côte/Falaise 12.1 53.1 53.8 3.94 0.71 3.09 0.60
Vakinankaratra 10.1 71.0 77.5 2.82 0.59 2.42 0.17
Total 8.1 56.6 71.8 7.01 1.36 4.15 0.90
Source: IFPRI/FOFIFA - community survey, 1997 (n=188 communities)10
 Rasoarimanana (1996) estimates that the vary jeby makes up 40 percent of
5
total cultivated area in the Marovoay plains region compared to 40 percent for
the vary asara and 20 percent for the vary atriatry.
Seasonal Movements in Prices
Different regions are characterized by differences in seasonal gaps and the
timing of peaks and troughs. For example, in Mahajanga, the highest price is
from February to April (Figure 1) while in Vakinankaratra, it is from November
through February. The biggest amplitude in 1997 could be detected in the
Mahajanga - Plateaux region (Table 5) as prices during the lean season were
more than triple the prices after the main harvest season. The smallest
amplitudes are seen in the Vakinankaratra and the Fianarantsoa - Haut Terres
region. However, prices during the lean season are still double the prices in the
harvest season in these regions. It is surprising to note that the seasonal
movement in Mahajanga - Plains shows the same magnitude as those in other
regions despite the presence of three distinct production seasons in this region.
However, it is evident that the "vary jeby" constitutes the major harvest period as


































































Figure 1-Income from commercial surplus Mahajanga - Plains (Fmg/month per
household (Oct. 95-Sept. 96))
Table 5-Lowest and highest rice price and seasonal gap (June 96 - May 97) 
Region Rice price Seasonal gap
Lowest Highest
 (Fmg/kg) (Fmg)
Mahajanga:Plains Mean 1220 2443 1223
Std. Deviation 271 307 402
Mahajanga:Plateaux Mean 964 2935 1971
Std. Deviation 263 789 810
Fianar:Highlands Mean 1077 2076 998
Std. Deviation 129 236 286
Fianar:Côte/Falaise Mean 1218 2384 1166
Std. Deviation 255 214 301
Vakinankaratra Mean 1212 2193 981
Std. Deviation 177 274 349
Total Mean 1113 2394 1281
Std. Deviation 236 544 616
Source: IFPRI/FOFIFA - community survey, 1997 (n=188 communities)
If rice markets would function efficiently, the distinct differences in seasonal rice
production and prices for different regions would be to the benefit of large rice12
 Minten (1997) shows that the seasonal movement for rice in Antananarivo over
6
the last decade was only 25 percent.
 The rate of return was calculated by dividing the difference in prices between
7
each consecutive post-harvest month and the harvest month by the price during
the harvest month.  No losses were imposed. Hence, rates of return are
overestimated. It is also dangerous to invoke profitability of storage based on
one year data. Hence, although the rates might be indicative, caution in
interpretation is warranted.
 The high level of return in Mahajanga - Plateaux might be an extreme value as
8
it seems that diseases (rice fleas, virose) and inundation hit this region hard
during the 1997 season. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that it can
reasonably be assumed that even in normal years, seasonal gaps are quite high
in this region.
importing, higher price areas, such as Antananarivo, as they would be able to
procure their rice from those exporting regions where the price is 
lowest at that moment. Hence, seasonal movements in big urban centers are
often much lower than in rural areas . Due to these different price patterns,
6
optimal storage periods at the village level differ between different rural regions.
Storage for six months in Mahajanga - Plains and Fianarantsoa - Côte/Falaise
results in rates of return between 75 percent and 90 percent.  The higher level of
7
return in a shorter period in Mahajanga - Plains might be due to the different
harvest period (November) which allows this region to sell rice at the time of the
lean period in other regions. The lowest rate of return is noticed in the
Vakinankaratra region where storage profitability shows a smooth and slow














 The same variation is noticed in a temporal analysis of seasonal movements in
9
one location (Antananarivo): price stability is higher when prices are low and
vice-versa.
The seasonal movement in spatial price variation over all the fokontany over one
season follows the same pattern as the price level of rice (Figure 2). Spatial
variation in prices, as measured by its standard deviation, is less during the
post-harvest season - when prices are low - than during the lean period .
9
Variation is highest during the months of March and April and lowest from May to
July. This decline in spatial variation in rice prices seems to be due to better
road conditions, lower transport costs, and the almost universal  situation of rice
exports out of the villages during the dry season. The importance of the thin
markets argument is illustrated by the fact that the standard deviation is low in
the month of November/December in Mahajanga 
- Plains, i.e. during the harvest period in that region, although the road situation
is already bad during that period. 
Figure 2-Income from commercial surplus Mahajanga - Plateaux (Fmg/month per
household (Oct. 95 - Sept. 96))14
 Fianarantsoa II (rural) compared to Fianarantsoa I (town); Antsirabe II (rural)
10
compared to Antsirabe I (town).
 For example, Barrett (1997) estimates that 93 percent of the interseasonal
11
storage capacity of the Vakinankaratra region is located in the urban center of
Antsirabe.
 This situation also creates problems with traditional market integration
12
measures used in previous studies. Low integration coefficients, as measured by
correlation coefficients or simple regression models, do not necessarily mean
that markets are segmented or not integrated. Even if you have effective
physical flows between different regions and arbitrage opportunities are
effectively dealt with, you still might come up with low integration coefficients.
Hence, the importance of segmented markets in Madagascar might have been
overstated in previous studies (Azam et al. 1992; Roubaud 1997). See also
Minten et al. (1998) for a more extensive discussion of the buying and selling
behavior of rural households.
Seasonal Movements in Rural - Urban Price Ratios 
The difference in the magnitude of the seasonal movements for different regions
also often reflects effective physical flows that are reverted during the year.
Figure 3 shows how urban - rural price ratios change over the course of the
season in Fianarantsoa city and Antsirabe city and nearby rural areas . Prices
10
in urban areas are higher during the harvest and post-harvest period (from April
through September) and lower during the lean period (October through March).
It seems that a large part of commercial stocks are stored in towns after the
harvest and then moved back from towns to rural areas during the lean season .
11












Results from the output trader survey seem to indicate that these flows are not
only confined to cities and their nearby rural areas, but that they seem to
encompass even broader rural urban rice movements. Rice flows seem to go
from Mahajanga - Plateaux to Mahajanga city during the harvest while the
reverse happens during the lean period. The same is partly true in the
Fianarantsoa region. Rice goes from Fianarantsoa - Highlands to Fianarantsoa
city during the harvest season and back during the lean season. Another part of
the commercial rice goes to the Fianarantsoa - Côte/Falaise region. However,
without effective data on flows available, caution is warranted as the shift in
price ratios could also be observable in case of market segmentation, which
would leave better supplied urban centers with lower prices without any reverse
flows taking place.  Further, it might also be the case that some regions are
effective deficit regions and rural areas are supplemented with imported rice
from elsewhere.
Figure 3–Income from commercial surplus Fianarantsoa - Highlands etc.
(Fmg/month per household (Oct. 95 - Sept. 96))16
3.  DETERMINANTS OF MARKET ACCESS AND PRICES
METHODOLOGY
In this section, determinants of market access, price levels, and price variability
are explored. If effective flows exist between rural areas and urban centers,
prices would be expected to follow the relationship: 
P = P  - T - A - R 
p    C
where P represents the village or producer price, P  the consumer price, T
p              C
transportation costs, A transaction costs, and R rents. In a competitive market, R
would be zero and differences between consumer and producer prices would
reflect only transportation costs and transaction costs.  In a non-competitive
market, the margins would be higher than the sum of the two categories of costs.
As these different costs are difficult to measure directly, proxies are used in the
empirical estimation. Transportation costs seem to be mostly related to hard
infrastructure (H) and transaction costs, mostly to soft infrastructure (S). Rents
by traders could be reflected in monopoly or oligopoly positions of traders,
measured by the possibility of choice between traders (C). Regional dummies
are included in the regression to reflect the distances of the respective rural
fivondronana (D), in which the villages were selected, and the cities, or between
producers and consumers. The estimated model is as follows:
Price levels (P ) = f(H, S, C, D) 
p
The right-hand side variables in the previous regression are assumed to be
related. Given that construction, upgrading, and maintenance of hard
infrastructure is often important for public policy decisions, we will specifically
look at its relationships with prices and other variables, and more specifically
how it affects the possibility of choice between traders, the number and type of17
traders that buy in the area, and the presence of soft infrastructure. While
infrastructure can be considered an exogenous variable in determination of
choices between traders, the relationship between soft and hard infrastructure is
more complex. While soft infrastructure responds to hard infrastructure, the
process also works the other way as governments tend to allocate their
infrastructure investments in response to the agro-climatic potential of regions,
i.e. in the same way as soft infrastructure tends to be allocated. Accordingly, just
the relationship is illustrated, without invoking causality by lack of available
instruments. The form for the choice between traders regression is the following: 
Choice between traders/ type of trader (C)= f(H, S, D)
The last empirical part of this section looks at the determinants of seasonal
spreads in prices over an agricultural year (June 1996 - May 1997).  Under the
assumptions of perfect competition, seasonality would reflect the cost of storage
plus the normal profits of the storage agent. These costs would reflect fixed
costs (wages, storage facilities, etc.), variable costs (interest payments, weight
loss, variable labor costs, etc.), and a risk premium for holding on to stocks.
Even in the case of perfect competition, if storage does not happen in the
consumption site, transportation costs have to be added in the seasonal spread
and different regions might supply a specific village at a different time (Benirscha
and Binkley 1995). In practice, higher seasonality could also be related to
oligopsonist trading or non-competitive market practices and uncertainty in
seasonal price movements to expectations. Moreover, indirect policy
interventions also affect seasonal spreads as through the promotion of
competitive markets, they might reduce the cost of inter-temporal arbitrage by
lowering risks, constraints, and transactions costs  (Sahn and Delgado 1989). As
none of these costs are directly available, the estimated model is formulated in a
reduced form:
 Seasonal spread (P  - P ) =  f(W, Cr, S, H, C, R, D) 
pt    p018
 As there were not enough observations in the medium distance - no access to
13
roads category, this category was aggregated with the close to paved road but
no access to roads category.
 The index was a simple sum of no access (0) or access (1) to the different
14
variables in the fokontany: commercial banks, savings deposit, post office, public
telephone, link radio-contact (BLU), electricity, police, chemical fertilizer,
improved varieties of rice, and agricultural extension.
where W represents wages, Cr access to credit, and R a co-variant risk factor.
The other variables retain the same meaning as in the previous equations.
Given the omni-presence of rice in the survey region, this product is well-suited
to study the determinants of the level and the variability of prices. Seasonality
was calculated as the difference between the lowest and the highest monthly
rice price during the period June 1996 - May 1997. To incorporate the effect of
distance, different categories were constructed that reflect communities close to,
at a medium distance to, and far away from the main paved road. The division in
these three categories was based on the time required to get to a paved road
during the dry season, i.e. the period when most agricultural products are sold.
Close to the paved road were communities that are within less than two hours
walking time from the paved road; medium distance, between two and eight
hours and far away, more than eight hours. To estimate the effect of the road
quality, these three categories were considered with communities that had
access to the main road through an all-season road, a seasonal road, or no road
at all in their fokontany. In the analysis we end up with eight categories . The
13
default prices are prices in communities that have access to a paved road in
their fokontany. An index measuring access to soft infrastructure was
constructed which reflects measures of access to credit, information, security,
and agricultural inputs . 
1419
PRICE LEVELS 
Rice prices during the harvest periods were taken as dependent variables for the
price level regression as most fokontany do sell and export rice during that
period. As expected, hard infrastructure matters for agricultural price levels. The
distance to the main paved road and the quality of the road infrastructure
connecting to the main road are significant determinants of rice prices as shown
in the reduced form (Table 6 - Model 1). Communities that have access to all-
season roads show, on average, higher prices than communities that have only
access to seasonal roads or communities that do not have access to roads.
Communities that are far away from the main road show lower prices than
communities that are close to the main road. The negative signs are an
indication that all prices in communities off the paved road are lower than in
communities that have access to paved roads. The consistent signs seem to be
an indication of the fact that spatial markups reflect costs of transport and
handling. However, to analyze the extent to which this is the case, price changes
as a function of distance and hours traveled are calculated. 20
Table 6-Regression of the impact of distance to paved road and quality of infrastructure on producer price levels
of rice (Fmg/kg)
Independent variables Model 1** Model 2
Coefficients t-value Significance Coefficients t-value Significance
Intercept 1280.31 17.13 0.000 1177.04 13.68 0.000
Dummy fok. with no road - medium distance to paved road* -97.96 -1.18 0.238 -86.00 -1.02 0.307
Dummy fok. with no road - far distance to paved road -241.93 -2.76 0.006 -213.24 -2.34 0.020
Dummy fok. with all-season road - close distance to paved road -26.58 -0.44 0.662 -15.04 -0.24 0.808
Dummy fok. with all-season road - medium distance to paved road -168.96 -2.44 0.016 -170.96 -2.41 0.017
Dummy fok. with all-season road - far distance to paved road -161.13 -2.42 0.016 -146.11 -2.15 0.033
Dummy fok. with seasonal road - close distance to paved road -112.84 -1.51 0.132 -84.26 -1.10 0.275
Dummy fok. with seasonal road - medium distance to paved road -152.13 -2.24 0.027 -124.89 -1.73 0.085
Dummy fok. with seasonal road - far distance to paved road -204.16 -2.71 0.007 -176.30 -2.23 0.027
Dummy possibility of choice traders (1=yes) 67.25 1.77 0.079
Index soft infrastructure 27.48 1.84 0.067
Dummy fivondronana Fianarantsoa II -105.52 -1.62 0.108 -104.04 -1.61 0.109
Dummy fivondronana Ikongo 141.35 1.74 0.083 131.18 1.62 0.107
Dummy fivondronana Manakara 16.03 0.24 0.812 26.14 0.38 0.701
Dummy fivondronana Marovoay 24.91 0.28 0.780 -13.14 -0.15 0.883
Dummy fivondronana Bealanana -341.51 -4.25 0.000 -281.17 -3.36 0.001
Dummy fivondronana Mampikony -43.18 -0.57 0.570 -65.47 -0.87 0.387
Dummy fivondronana Antsirabe 52.19 0.65 0.516 44.06 0.56 0.580
Total number of observations 188 188
Adjusted R2 0.309 0.324
F-value 6.556 6.27
Source: Own calculations based on IFPRI/FOFIFA - community survey, 1997 (n=188 communities)
*close to paved road: less than two hours walking; medium distance: between two and eight hours; far: more than
eight hours
** independent variables include only hard infrastructure21
 The exchange rate at the time of the survey was around 4500 Fmg/US$.
15
 These estimates are consistent with the salary levels. An average salary in the
16
region amounts to 6 kapoaka of rice a day, which is equivalent to 2100 Fmg in
the harvest season. Assuming that one person can transport one bag of rice (50
kg), this would amount to a daily salary of 2200 Fmg.
The average time required to get to the main road is calculated for each of these
categories (Table 7). Coefficients are aggregated using the relative weights of
the different villages to estimate the overall effect of road quality and distance. A
calculation of the average price decline per km or per hour of traveling time
shows that it amounts overall, weighted by the importance of each category, to
24 Fmg/kg/hour or 8 Fmg/kg/km .  There seems to be some leveling off in the
15
effect of distance on prices the further one has to go. The price declines are
relatively larger the closer one is to the main road 
and amount to 13 Fmg/kg/km for the closest category, and 10 Fmg/kg/km for the
medium category .  For the far away category, price declines are only 2
16
Fmg/kg/km. This might partly be due to the fact that the further one is from the
main road, the more economic it becomes to use other and cheaper means of
transport than transport by foot. However, even if one uses the same means of
transportation, there are natural economies of scale over longer distances which
reduce per unit transportation costs. 
Mendoza and Randrianarisoa (1998) estimate the transportation costs based on
an output trader survey in the same period and in the same regions as about 2
Fmg/kg/km for trucks and lorries, 5 Fmg/kg/km for ox-carts, and 14 Fmg/kg/km
for the pousse-pousse or calèche. Hence, these figures are of the same order of
magnitude, since the former are used for long distances and 22
Table 7-Calculation of decline of producer prices in function of transport infrastructure and distance to paved road
  Percentage Coefficient Time to paved  Fmg/kg/hour Fmg/kg/km
  of villages regression road (hours)
Fokontany with paved road 7.6
Fokontany with no road - medium distance to paved road* 5.1 -97.96 3.33 -29.44 -9.81
Fokontany with no road - far distance to paved road 5.2 -241.93 33.54 -7.21 -2.40
Fokontany with all-season road - close distance to paved road 24.3 -26.58 0.93 -28.43 -9.48
Fokontany with all-season road - medium distance to paved road 14.0 -168.96 5.60 -30.15 -10.05
Fokontany with all-season road - far distance to paved road 11.6 -161.13 26.60 -6.06 -2.02
Fokontany with seasonal road - close distance to paved road 7.6 -112.84 1.49 -75.88 -25.29
Fokontany with seasonal road - medium distance to paved road 13.3 -152.13 5.26 -28.94 -9.65
Fokontany with seasonal road - far distance to paved road 11.3 -204.16 35.73 -5.71 -1.90
TOTAL 100.0 -23.95 -7.98
Aggregated along distance
Fokontany at a close distance to the paved road 31.9 -39.72 -13.24
Fokontany at a medium distance to a paved road 32.4 -29.54 -9.85
Fokontany at a far distance to a paved road 28.2 -6.13 -2.04
Aggregated along road quality
Fokontany with no road 10.3 -18.18 -6.06
Fokontany with all-season road 49.9 -23.71 -7.90
Fokontany with seasonal road 32.2 -31.83 -10.61
Source: Own calculations based on IFPRI/FOFIFA - community survey, 1997 (n=188 communities)
*close to paved road: less than two hours walking; medium distance: between two and eight hours; far: more than
eight hours23
 Results in the former Zaire also show that transportation costs explain  most of
17
those spatial differences, i.e. around three quarters of the producer - wholesale
margin (Minten and Kyle 1995).
the latter for short ones. They also illustrate the close relationship between the
decline in agricultural prices and the cost of transportation, and seem to indicate
that most of the spatial differences in agricultural producer prices in the harvest
period are explained by transportation costs .
17
The type of road does not seem to have a significant impact on the cost per hour
traveled. The cost per hour to transport goods seems to not vary by type of road
but influences the time required to get to the paved road. If an all-season road
exists, one can get to the main road faster than if there is no easy road at all.
The quantitative implications of upgrading (or worsening) road infrastructure on
rice prices are clear. Communities that are far away from the main paved road
receive, on average and using 
the regression results, a rice price that is 13 percent to 18 percent lower,
depending on the type of infrastructure, than the price on a paved road. 
Not only is hard infrastructure a determinant of price levels, but soft
infrastructure and the possibility of choice between traders are as well. Access
to credit, banks, telephones, radio-contact (BLU), extension, etc. might cause
increased production levels, better access to output markets, better information
flows, and might therefore increase producer prices. As can be expected,
distance to the paved road is correlated to soft infrastructure and to the choice
among traders.  An alternative model was run in which these variables were
added to the regression (Table 6 - Model 2). While the inclusion of these
variables reduces the significance of some coefficients on hard infrastructure,
the explanatory power of the regression increases, indicating that these24
variables affect price levels, in addition to hard infrastructure. Both coefficients
turn out to be significant. If farmers in a fokontany can choose between traders
to sell their products, price levels are 67 Fmg/kg or 6 percent of the average rice
price higher, ceteris paribus. Soft infrastructure also increases price levels and
shows an elasticity of 3.3 percent. In short, these results seem to imply that
creating hard infrastructure is a necessary, and quantitatively the most important
determinant, of increased producer prices. Soft infrastructure has a beneficial
influence, over and above the effect of hard infrastructure, but its effect on the
price is small during the harvest period when most households sell. 
MARKET ACCESS
Determinants of market access are looked at in this section. To this end, models
are estimated that evaluate the impact of the determinants on choice between
traders for the main agricultural products and the number of traders that buy at
the community level. The choice between traders and the number of traders that
buy is assumed to be related to infrastructure as well as the size of the village
and population density in the region.  Correspondingly, lack of choice might be
linked to low market volumes that inhibit traders to come and buy products. The
results of these regressions are shown in Table 8.
The regression results suggest that choice between traders is negatively related
to the distance to market sites (the variable is significant at 15 percent). As
shown in the household level analysis (Minten et al. 1998), a great deal of the
trade in agricultural products happens in regular market sites25
Table 8-Determinants of choice between traders and number of traders over the last year
Variable Choice between traders (logit) Number of big traders (tobit) Number of small collectors (tobit)
Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value
Intercept 0.232 0.205 -1.617 -0.039 82.808 1.001
Fokontany with no road - medium distance to paved road* 1.529 1.207 -47.303 -1.297 12.473 0.170
Fokontany with no road - far distance to paved road 2.412 1.502 -248.730 -0.066 5.518 0.068
Fokontany with all-season road - close distance to paved road 0.834 1.067 -57.832 -2.104 15.185 0.256
Fokontany with all-season road - medium distance to paved road 1.770 2.032 -22.095 -0.770 40.360 0.661
Fokontany with all-season road - far distance to paved road 1.086 1.153 -20.989 -0.658 94.841 1.447
Fokontany with seasonal road - close distance to paved road 0.841 0.873 -112.500 -2.663 73.463 1.032
Fokontany with seasonal road - medium distance to paved road 1.598 1.481 -18.982 -0.553 -10.646 -0.159
Fokontany with seasonal road - far distance to paved road 1.786 1.388 -11.184 -0.282 75.115 1.031
Distance to market -0.176 -1.478 0.956 0.251 -2.954 -0.447
Soft infrastructure index -0.306 -1.467 14.673 1.994 8.213 0.639
Population fokontany 0.000 0.406 0.002 0.705 -0.004 -0.611
Population density 0.004 1.493 0.009 0.130 -0.045 -0.412
Dummy fivondronana Fianarantsoa II -0.281 -0.353 29.376 0.994 14.891 0.257
Dummy fivondronana Ikongo 12.116 0.057 -47.506 -1.254 41.899 0.617
Dummy fivondronana Manakara 0.539 0.560 -33.024 -1.062 -83.490 -1.401
Dummy fivondronana Marovoay 2.131 1.472 12.088 0.324 -197.750 -2.360
Dummy fivondronana Bealanana -3.073 -2.645 -275.850 -0.082 31.316 0.431
Dummy fivondronana Mampikony 1.598 1.377 -76.772 -1.855 -93.044 -1.359
Dummy fivondronana Antsirabe -0.798 -0.785 -53.176 -1.318 -56.932 -0.785
Number of observations 188 145 145
Log likelihood function -76.75 -294.19 -758.79
Source: Own calculations based on IFPRI/FOFIFA - community survey, 1997
*close to paved road: less than two hours walking; medium distance: between two and eight hours; far: more than
eight hours.26
 For example, Barrett (1997) reports an average of only 1.5 pure wholesale
18
collector per periodic market area in the Vakinankaratra region.
 For example, wheat, barley and seed multiplication in the Vakinankatra region
19
and cotton, beans, and tobacco in the Mahajanga area.
while a minority happens in the village itself. Hence, the closer the village is to a
market site, the higher the probability that the village reports the possibility of
choice between traders. However, the influence of market sites on choices might
be limited in some cases because the number of wholesalers per market site is
low . The population density and size of the village show the expected positive,
18
but statistically insignificant, effect on choice between traders. Traders might find
it profitable to go to those villages and areas as they are more likely to ensure a
load and experience less search costs because the total commercial surplus is
higher. 
The possibility of choice between traders is not directly positively related to hard
and soft infrastructure. Various reasons may explain this. First, regions that are
better endowed with infrastructure seem to rely more on 
contract agriculture than regions with less infrastructure . Second, there is
19
evidence that in some regions farmers lock themselves into credit relations with
traders (Zeller 1994; Barrett 1997). These traders provide those farmers with
cash, food, or access to agricultural inputs during the lean period in exchange
for part of their products during the harvest period. Because of these kinds of
relationships, farmers might feel that they have no choice with respect to output
channels. This practice might exist more in fokontany that are endowed with
better infrastructure since they may be better able to establish those longer-term
relationships while the fokontany further away have to rely more on itinerant27
 Fraslin (1997) mentions for example that in well-endowed irrigation areas (the
20
"Petit Perimètres Irrigués") in the Highlands, one third of the harvest is already
sold before the actual harvest ("vente sur pied") during certain seasons.
 As well as with market access variables. While one big collector or miller has
21
several sub-collectors that operate for him, they might give the impression of
choice in villages or markets where the collector is not located. However, this is
not the case in the better endowed places where the big collector is located.
Given the often pyramid trading structure in the rice market for example - from
many sub-collectors to one or only a few big collectors/millers - this might give a
distorted image of the possibility of choice.
traders or sub-collectors who go to villages to fill bags and oxcarts . Moreover,
20
Fafchamps and Minten (1998) show that bigger traders tend to rely more on
regular suppliers and longer-term relationships than smaller ones do. The tobit
models presented in Table 8 show that bigger traders tend to have more
activities in fokontany with better hard and soft infrastructure while the
regression on small collectors shows that their number is not related to
infrastructure and distance, i.e. they have activities in all the fokontany
irrespective of infrastructure. 
Moreover, there might also be methodological problems with infrastructure
variables as separate determinants of market access . Disentangling the effect
21
of the different types of infrastructure is difficult as distance to 
markets and soft infrastructure are related to hard infrastructure. While invoking
causality would be inappropriate, Table 9 illustrates the close relationship very
well. Communities that are located on a paved road show an average soft
infrastructure index that is four times as high as for villages located far from a
main road. In general, the further villages are located from the main road and the
lower the quality of infrastructure, the lower the index of soft infrastructure.28
Distances to regular markets show the same trends. Villages that are located on
the main paved road are less than one hour away from a market site, while the
villages that are located far from the paved road and that have no road or only a
seasonal road are, on average, more than 4 and 5 hours away from a market
site. These averages illustrate that soft, market, and hard infrastructure tend to
be located in the same places. Hence, it should be kept in mind that there is
collinearity with the variables in the regressions and that this might influence
interpretation. On the other hand, they are not perfectly correlated as the
inclusion of extra infrastructure variables increases the explanatory power in the
different models that are presented.
Table 9-Relation between soft, market, and hard infrastructure
Road category Mean Time (hours) required
Soft index to get to market site
Fokontany with paved road 2.41 0.89
Fokontany with no road - medium distance to paved road* 1.19 1.14
Fokontany with no road - far distance to paved road 0.73 4.31
Fokontany with all-season road - close distance to paved road 1.67 1.35
Fokontany with all-season road - medium distance to paved road 1.57 0.61
Fokontany with all-season road - far distance to paved road 1.36 1.07
Fokontany with seasonal road - close distance to paved road 1.20 1.84
Fokontany with seasonal road - medium distance to paved road 0.77 2.52
Fokontany with seasonal road - far distance to paved road 0.92 5.56
Total 1.36 2.00
Source: IFPRI/FOFIFA - community survey, 1997 (n=188 communities)
*close to paved road: less than two hours walking; medium distance: between
two and eight hours; far: more than eight hours
PRICE VARIABILITY
While high price levels during the harvest period are clearly very important for
income generation of the selling households (60 percent of the rural households
in the case of rice), so are low price levels during the lean season as a29
significant proportion of rural households become buyers during that period (80
percent of the rural households). The results of the regression on the
determinants of the seasonal spread are presented in Table 10. As the focus is
on rice price variability, alternative regressions were run for those villages where
rice presents more than 50 percent (the "rice villages") and less than 50 percent
(the "non-rice" villages) of total income in the village. 
This distinction might reflect villages that are relatively more self-sufficient in rice
compared to villages that are relative net importers of rice. 
Different reasons can be invoked for seasonal price movements in Madagascar.
The first is the cost of capital. Previous studies in Madagascar seem indeed to
indicate that access to credit and a well-functioning rural financial system are
critical for traders and rural households alike to ensure an efficient functioning of
markets (Badiane et al. 1997; Zeller 1993). If the costs of borrowing are higher
due to credit shortages, the costs of working capital will be high and the
incentives for quick turnover by traders or storage agents will be great. This
might reduce the size of the working stock and diminish buffers against transitory
food shortages. One might therefore expect that to the extent that the economic
reforms have constricted credit to traders, there might be a higher variability
(Alderman and Shively 1996). On the other hand, opportunity costs for rural
households are also high as they often need to sell products to pay back loans.
Informal lenders in rural areas charge about 60 percent annual interest rate on
loans (Zeller 1993).30
Table 10-Determinants of seasonal spread in rice prices (Oct. 95 - Sept. 96)
Independent variables Overall Non-rice villages** Rice villages
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Intercept 1141.3 3.194 1721.1 3.017 1832.4 3.976
Dummy fok. with no road - medium distance to paved road* 200.1 0.953 450.1 1.742 -356.5 -1.169
Dummy fok. with no road - far distance to paved road -72.8 -0.318 307.0 1.054 -208.0 -0.621
Dummy fok. with all-season road - close distance to paved road 101.6 0.663 -2.2 -0.012 172.1 0.758
Dummy fok. with all-season road - medium distance to paved road 225.6 1.328 378.5 1.721 -108.2 -0.439
Dummy fok. with all-season road - far distance to paved road 121.5 0.702 266.3 1.198 -120.2 -0.530
Dummy fok. with seasonal road - close distance to paved road 63.7 0.349 89.5 0.366 -0.5 -0.002
Dummy fok. with seasonal road - medium distance to paved road 168.6 0.965 339.8 1.550 -37.9 -0.153
Dummy fok. with seasonal road - far distance to paved road 242.2 1.193 656.2 2.670 -255.9 -0.840
Dummy possibility of choice output traders (1=yes) -177.2 -1.954 -86.0 -0.542 -2.4 -0.021
Index soft infrastructure -74.4 -1.935 9.1 0.156 -68.9 -1.286
Percentage of households without land 4.2 2.487 3.2 1.458 2.4 0.635
Climatic and disease risk index 8.9 1.831 3.5 0.560 3.1 0.426
Time to get to market site (hours) -31.7 -2.131 54.9 1.912 -37.4 -2.196
Dummy savings group (1=yes) 40.2 0.362 -481.3 -2.531 55.6 0.424
Dummy mutual help group (1=yes) -115.8 -1.407 -85.0 -0.705 -188.6 -1.738
Dummy Communal Storage Scheme (1=yes) 35.6 0.274 -89.5 -0.348 -102.6 -0.737
Dummy formal credit (1=yes) -30.0 -0.297 5.1 0.036 -229.3 -1.776
Dummy informal credit (1=yes) -48.9 -0.602 -57.9 -0.540 -228.0 -1.893
Real wage level (in number of kapoaka of rice per day) 0.1 1.152 0.0 0.236 0.2 1.675
Dummy fivondronana Fianarantsoa II -32.3 -0.201 105.4 0.354 -385.2 -1.388
Dummy fivondronana Ikongo 121.3 0.537 106.9 0.375
Dummy fivondronana Manakara 13.0 0.074 175.5 0.827 74.2 0.233
Dummy fivondronana Marovoay 362.1 1.700 -60.2 -0.192 217.8 0.651
Dummy fivondronana Bealanana 1269.9 5.835 1812.3 5.897 954.6 3.042
Dummy fivondronana Mampikony 786.3 4.025 876.8 3.887 204.4 0.616
Dummy fivondronana Antsirabe 71.9 0.380 144.9 0.744 -463.1 -1.180
Total number of observations 188 188.0 188
Adjusted R2 0.468 0.633 0.575
F-value 7.234 6.904 6.089
Source: Own calculations based on IFPRI/FOFIFA - community survey, 1997 (n=188 communities)
*close to paved road: less than two hours walking; medium distance: between two and eight hours; far: more than
eight hours
** non-rice villages: villages where rice represents less than 50% of income; rice villages: rice represents more
than 50% of village income31
However, there is also severe credit rationing so shadow costs for credit-
constrained households are even higher (Zeller 1994). These high opportunity
costs induce the rural households to sell immediately after harvest, flood the
market with produce, and therefore increase the seasonal spread. 
Most of the variables that measure capital costs and that were included in the
regression - presence of  formal credit, informal credit, a communal storage
scheme, savings groups, mutual help groups in the village - show the expected
negative sign but none of them are significant at the overall level. However, the
magnitude of the coefficients of these variables increases and the coefficients
become highly significant in the regression for the rice villages alone. In this
case, the presence of formal and informal credit together reduce the seasonal
spread by 18 percent. It seems that access to credit effectively reduces the cost
of storage through a reduction of the cost of capital in the rice villages. The
seasonal spread on rice prices in non-rice villages might be less affected by
access to credit as these villages do not have enough rice to store in any event,
even if the cost of capital is reduced. The coefficient on mutual aid groups turns
out to be significant in the rice villages while savings groups are significant in
the non-rice villages. Adding soft infrastructure to credit matters as it shows a
negative and significant sign in the overall regression. Its elasticity is evaluated
at 6 percent.
The significance of the coefficient on the percentage of households without land
- presumably also net buyers of rice - as a measure for the level of poverty seem
to indicate that the higher the level of poverty in the village, the higher the
seasonal spread in the overall regression. The significance of this term seems
mostly to be driven by the non-rice villages. Demand for rice in this case might
be more likely to be met by imported rice in the village and hence transport costs
from the city, where most of the storage seem to occur, to the village have to be32
imputed and added to the seasonal spread. On-farm storage losses also
contribute to seasonal price patterns. Previous research indicates that this does
not seem to be the main reason for seasonal movement as few farmers report
this as their main problem (Randrianarisoa 1997). However, physical quantity
losses seem to be real due to humidity losses. It would have been expected that
the higher the co-variant risk in the village, measured by the number of climatic
and plant disease calamities over the last ten years, the less overall production,
the more storage losses, and/or the faster the village wants to sell its harvest,
and hence, the higher the seasonal spread. However, while the coefficients on
risk show the expected sign, they are not significant.
Hard infrastructure shows little direct effect on the seasonal spread in the overall
regression. However, hard infrastructure becomes highly significant for the non-
rice villages. In this case, rice is imported to the village in the lean season and
the positive sign on distances to the main road and on quality of infrastructure
reflects transportation costs from the paved road to the village. The distance to
the market shows a significant negative sign for the overall regression. It is
interesting to note that the distance to the market has different effects on the rice
villages compared to the non-rice villages. The distance to the market site shows
a significant negative effect on the seasonal spread for the rice villages. One
extra hour away from a market site would reduce the seasonal spread by 50
Fmg/kg (the elasticity is evaluated at 10.3 percent). It might be the case that rice
villages with more difficult access to a market site store more themselves and
reduce seasonality in that way. Rice villages with access to a market might
participate relatively more in market transactions, and sell during harvest and
buy during the lean period. For the non-rice villages, the seasonal spread
increases significantly with the distance to the market site. This reflects transport
costs imputed for the rice brought into the village during the lean season. The
elasticity is evaluated at 5.5 percent.  33
One other potential explanation for seasonal price movements is that traders
manipulate prices and increase profits by monopsony buying at harvest time or
monopoly selling in the lean period or both. Traders could extract profits from
farmers through creditor-debtor relationships or through tied transactions to
keep farmers at a bargaining distance (Alderman and Shively 1996; Sahn and
Delgado 1989). To a certain extent, this seems to be the case as the coefficient
on the possibility of choice between traders variable turns out to be large and
significant in the overall regression. Prices during the harvest season tend to be
lower (as seen in the regression in the previous section), prices during the lean
season higher, and seasonal gaps bigger in those communities where no choice
between traders exists. Seasonal gaps are 12 percent higher for villages that
have no choice between traders compared to villages that have the choice,
ceteribus paribus. In the previous section the regressions show that prices
during the harvest season are 67 Fmg/kg lower if communities had no choice.
The combination of choice effects during harvest time and the lean period imply
that seasonal gaps are 177 Fmg/kg bigger for communities with no choice.
However, the results on the choice in traders are not robust as shown in the
regressions that are split up for rice and non-rice villages.34
4.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper documents access to infrastructure, output markets and rural
agricultural prices based on a recent community survey in Madagascar. Market
infrastructure development is low as only 8 percent of the communities report
having to access to a paved road and to a local market. It is shown that there are
significant seasonal movements in food marketing as rice prices in rural areas
are more than twice as high during the lean period than during the harvest
period. There is significant spatial variation as well, as prices are 40 percent and
27 percent higher in the lean and harvest period respectively in the higher priced
region compared to the lower priced region. This regional and temporal
averages hide even more variability at the village level.
The analysis links the price variation to structural determinants. Hard
infrastructure is an important determinant of producer price levels. Price levels
decrease significantly as the distance to main roads increases and the quality of
infrastructure decreases, and they decrease relatively faster over shorter
distances than over longer distances. It is shown that distance matters more
than road quality as there is no strong relationship between road quality and the
decline of producer prices per unit of time, and as increased quality decreases
time traveled only marginally. Moreover, road  infrastructure does not
automatically lead to more competition among traders as hard infrastructure by
itself does not seem to increase the possibility of choice between traders.
Low seasonal price variation is important for rural communities as the majority of
rural households are sellers after the harvest period and buyers in the lean
period. It seems that rice price variability is related to distance to road and35
quality of hard infrastructure.  This seems to be the case especially for villages
where rice is less important as a source of revenue. Villages far off the main
road are extra vulnerable due to increased seasonal gaps and lower prices for
their products during the harvest season. On the other hand, access to formal
and informal credit reduces the seasonal spread significantly in those villages
where rice is an important source of income. 
Significant rural price variation in Madagascar reflects high transportation costs,
due to deficient road infrastructure and reversal of flows from rural to urban
areas, and high opportunity costs of capital. Adding investment in soft
infrastructure to hard infrastructure seems to be beneficial to successfully
increase producer prices, to reduce food price variability, and to improve market
integration. The methodology used complements the results from most price
integration studies as it highlights the importance of different causes for price
variation and lack of co-variation between communities.  In so doing, it should
help lead to more relevant and appropriate policy answers. 36
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